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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the eect of measurement error on low-pay
transition probabilities. Our approach combines the virtues of panel regression and
Latent Class models, while it does not require the use of validation or re-interview
data. Using British, German and Dutch panel data, we show that the true estimated
low-pay transition probability is much lower that what previous research has found.
This implies that almost half of the observed transitions can be attributed to mea-
surement error. The highest low-pay transition probabilities are found in Germany
and the lowest in the Netherlands. When applying this correction for measurement
error in a multivariate model of low-pay transitions, the results indicate that mea-
surement error attenuates considerably the eects of the main covariates, such as
training, job change, change in the employment contract type and shift from part-
time to full-time employment.
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Is there really low-pay mobility?
1 Introduction
The issue of low-pay mobility is receiving increasing interest in economic and political
debate (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1996, 1997, 2003; Ace-
moglu, 2003b, 2003a). The increase in wage inequality along with the increase in the
number of workers with wages below the low-wage threshold has raised equity and e-
ciency concerns. Low-pay mobility may have an equalizing eect on the earnings of these
workers. The higher the level of upward low-wage mobility, the greater the chances low-
paid workers have to improve the level of their earnings. Previous research, using data
from household surveys, suggests that there is substantial year-to-year mobility, especially
at the bottom of the wage distribution. Using data from the British Household Panel Sur-
vey (BHPS), Stewart and Swaeld (1999) nd that, depending on the low-pay threshold
used, between 29% and 48% of the British low paid move to a higher earnings state within
one year. Cappellari and Jenkins (2004b) conclude from their analysis that the fraction of
the British low-paid workers that make a transition to higher pay reaches 42.3% if we take
into account non-response and attrition. Similar percentages are found in several other
studies and for several other countries (see, for example, Sloane & Theodossiou, 1996,
1998; Cappellari, 2002). These studies show that although there is a considerable state
dependence in low pay, the average transition probabilities are much higher than common
sense would suggest.
A possible methodological explanation for these rather unexpected ndings is that panel
surveys contain measurement error. Survey respondents may misreport their income and
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interviewers do not always record the responses correctly, which can produce a substan-
tial amount of error in wage measurement. Using the SIPP dataset, Gottschalk (2005)
argues that two-thirds of the observed downward adjustments of nominal wages without
a job change are due to measurement error. Pischke (1995), using the PSID validation
study, suggests that measurement error overstates annual earnings' uctuation by 20%-
45%. When, as in the majority of economic studies on wages, hourly wages are derived
from yearly or monthly earnings, measurement error may be even larger as it is introduced
via two sources: earnings and hours of work (Rodgers et al., 1993). In an investigation of
the eect of measurement error on poverty transitions in the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP), Rendtel et al. (1998) conclude that approximately half of the observed tran-
sitions are due to measurement error. Lollivier and Daniel (2005) corroborate this result
for the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). Despite the enormous bias that
measurement error can cause in the estimation of wage dynamics, most relevant studies
ignore this phenomenon.
In the incomplete literature on measurement error in transition models, two approaches
are used. The rst approach to estimate measurement error uses either validation or rein-
terview data and assumes that this data is error free. In a validation study, the survey
information on the labour market status and income is compared to the same information
from administrative sources. A reinterview implies that respondents are asked to pro-
vide the same information as in the original survey a second time, typically under more
favourable conditions (better interviewer, more expanded questions, etc.). Poterba and
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Summers (1986, 1995) use the reinterview data from the Current Population Survey to
study the impact of measurement error on the estimated number of labour market transi-
tions. Magnac and Visser (1999) use prospective and retrospective data for the same time
period to study labour mobility of French workers with the Labour Force Survey. The
prospective data is treated as error-free.
The assumption that administrative and reinterview data are error-free is questioned by
several studies. The way administrative data are constructed and the denition of earnings
in these data may also introduce error (Nordberg, Rendtel, & Basic, 2004). Abowd and
Stinson (2005) study measurement error in the Survey of Income and Program Participa-
tion (SIPP) and in the Detailed Earnings Records (DER). The size of measurement error
is even higher in the administrative DER dataset (20%-27%) than in SIPP (13%-15%).
Kapteyn and Ypma (2007) suggest that the use of administrative data may lead to a se-
vere bias of results. The reason for this bias may be either measurement error or a failed
operationalization of the concept of earnings.
The second approach to correct for measurement error in transition models is applied
when no auxiliary (error-free) information is available. Rendtel et al. (1998) use such an
approach. More specically, they use a Latent Markov model with two measurements of
income to correct for measurement error in the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
Bassi et al. (2000) study labour market transitions of American workers using the SIPP
dataset without the use of auxiliary data. This approach is found in several studies dealing
with classication error in categorical variables (van de Pol & Langeheine, 1990; Vermunt
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et al., 1999; Paas et al., 2007). Regardless of the approach, most of these studies assume
that the errors made at two subsequent time periods are conditionally independent given
the true states. This is referred to as the assumption of the Independent Classication
Errors (ICE).
The aim of this paper is to investigate the bias that measurement error causes on
low-wage transitions. For this purpose, we develop a panel regression model for low-pay
transitions that corrects for measurement error. To correct for measurement error we use
a Mixed Latent Markov model, advancing the approach of Rendtel et al. (1998). While
Rendtel et al control for measurement error in aggregate transition probabilities, we also
correct for observed and unobserved heterogeneity and moreover work with a much longer
time series. In this way, we relax the unattractive property of population homogeneity
that is assumed in most of the studies using Markov models on labour market transitions.
The ICE assumption is mostly retained in this paper as we only use prospective and not
retrospective data. However, we perform some sensitivity analysis on the validity of this
assumption. Using three panel surveys (BHPS, GSOEP, SEP) we determine which pro-
portion of the observed low-pay transitions is spurious. Furthermore, we examine how
much bias ignoring measurement error causes in the eects of certain determinants of wage
mobility in a panel regression model. We choose to focus on those determinants that can
account for a considerable upward or downward change in the wage, and can therefore
cause a worker to move from low pay to high pay or vice versa. Such determinants in-
clude labour market events, such as a job change, a change of the employment contract
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type, or a considerable change in working hours. We expect the eect of these deter-
minants to be considerably underestimated by measurement error. In our analysis, we
distinguish between two earnings states, low-paid and higher-paid, as well as the state of
non-employment. For low pay, we apply the most common denition: a low-paid worker
is someone who earns less than two-thirds of the median wage (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 1996). Moreover, we test the sensitivity of our results to
alternative denitions of low pay.
Another novel aspect of this paper is that it investigates low-pay transitions in a cross-
country comparative perspective. Labour market institutions are believed to account for
dierences in the opportunities and the risks that individuals face in the various labour
markets in Europe (Freeman & Katz, 1995; Blau & Kahn, 1996). In liberal-unregulated
labour markets, such as the UK, there is a much higher level of job and wage mobility than
in regulated labour markets, such as Germany. Countries combining a high protection of
employment security with a high level of exibility in the labour market in terms of regu-
lations enhancing job mobility, such as the Netherlands, occupy an intermediate position.
Investigating low-pay transitions that are corrected for measurement error may be more
informative concerning the real extent of cross-country dierences in low-pay mobility and
hence of the impact of labour market institutions on this mobility than by simply looking
at observed transitions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses further the implications
of measurement error on wage mobility. Section 3 elaborates on the model we apply. The
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three datasets we use are presented in section 4. In section 5, we discuss the results
of our data analysis. These results consist of a descriptive part, where the aggregate
amount of measurement error is estimated as well as an part where we discuss the eect
of measurement error in low-pay transitions on the parameter estimation of a multivariate
panel regression model.
2 The implications of measurement error
The implications of measurement error on earnings have been studied with the use of
validation studies. The main nding of the literature are that although there is a high
level of misreporting earnings at the individual level, the error in the average estimate
of earnings is rather small (Duncan & Hill, 1985; Pischke, 1995; Bound et al., 2001).
Evidence also shows that measurement error in earnings is mean reverted. This means
that the measurement error is negatively correlated with the true value of earnings (Bound
& Krueger, 1991; Bound et al., 1994, 2001). Pischke (1995) suggests that the reason of this
negative correlation is that respondents typically underreport the transitory uctuations
of their earnings.
In the case of a categorical variable - such as in our study - the properties of measure-
ment error are similar with the case of earnings. The measurement error in a categorical
variable is always mean reverting (for a simple illustration, see, Bound et al., 2001). For
this paper, what matters more is measurement error in the estimation of year-to-year tran-
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sition matrices. Hagenaars (1990, 1994) shows that even small amounts of classication
error can lead to considerable bias in the estimation of such matrices. As a simple il-
lustration, let us assume a ctitious transition matrix for a discrete variable X with two
categories and between two time points. We further assume that there is error in the
observation of the variable X. Instead of X1 and X2, we rather observe the states Y1 and
Y2. The model for the joint distribution of Y1 and Y2 has the form of a Latent Class model
for two time points. More specically, the joint distribution of the observed states Y1 and
Y2 can be expressed as follows:
P (Y1 = y1; Y2 = y2) =
X
x1;x2
[P (X1 = x1)P (X2 = x2jX1 = x1) (1)
P (Y1 = y1jX1 = x1)P (Y2 = y2jX2 = x2)] :
In the above probability expression P (X1 = x1) denotes the probability of being in the
latent (true) state x1 at the rst time point and P (X2 = x2jX1 = x1) the probability of
being in the latent state x2 at the second time point, conditional on being in the latent state
x1 at the rst time point. The other two terms refer to the relationship between the latent
and observed states, and represent the measurement error component. P (Y1 = y1jX1 = x1)
denotes the probability of observing the state y1 conditional on being in the latent (true)
state x1. The expected observed transition probability is:
P (Y2 = y2jY1 = y1) = P (Y1 = y1; Y2 = y2)
P (Y1 = y1)
=
P (Y1 = y1; Y2 = y2)P
y2
P (Y1 = y1; Y2 = y2)
: (2)
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To illustrate the impact of measurement error, assume that P (X2 = x2jX1 = x1) = :05 for
x1 6= x2 and that P (Y1 = y1jX1 = x1) = P (Y2 = y1jX2 = x2) = :05 for y1 6= x1 and y2 6= x2.
Using equations (1) and (2) one can easily verify that the probability P (Y2 = y2jY1 = y1)
for y1 6= y2 equals :136 . In other words, even a small amount of classication error (5%)
results in a large increase in the number of the observed transitions, here by a factor of
2:72 (13.6% observed versus 5% real transitions).
In this paper, the categorical dependent variable X - the true earnings state - can be
seen as resulting from discretizing a continuous variable  that represents earnings from
paid employment. Assume that there are two states and that the cuto is at 0:
X = 1 if  > 0
and X = 0 if  < 0.
However, the observed earnings that are used to derive the observed state Y contain
measurement error , which means that:
Y = 1 if  +  > 0
and Y = 0 if  +  < 0.
This means that the implication of the discretization is that the classication error
probabilities P (Y = 1jX = 0) and P (Y = 0jX = 1) are in fact averages of P ( +  >
0j < 0) and P ( +  < 0j > 0) across  < 0 and  > 0, respectively.
Measurement error does not only result in an overestimation of the aggregate num-
ber of transitions, but may also have severe implications when trying to explain earnings
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dynamics. When failing to control for classication errors, the dependent variable in an
earnings transition model contains noise which is independent of the covariates. As a re-
sult, the eects of covariates will typically be underestimated even if covariates themselves
are error-free (Bollinger, 1996; Abrevaya & Hausman, 1997; Hausman et al., 2009).
Following Bound et al. (2001), let us assume a simple regression y = z + , with y
measured with error v (y = y+v, where y is the true value of the dependent variable) and
v = y+ v, where v is uncorrelated to z and . Then even if z is measured without error,
there is bias in the estimation of , which is proportional to . Empirical ndings, however,
are scarce and contradictory. Rodgers et al. (1993) and Bound et al. (1994) suggest that
since measurement error in earnings is mean reverting, the coecients of all explanatory
variables in a wage regression are biased towards zero by approximately 20%. They also
do not nd any consistent pattern of a relationship between the covariates and the error in
earnings. Using the PSID validation study, Duncan and Hill (1985) nd that measurement
error in log earnings attenuates the eect of tenure by 30% in a wage regression. However,
they do not nd a signicant eect on the coecient for education and labour market
experience. It should be noted here that the PSID validation study does not refer to the
same individuals as in the original survey. It was in fact conducted on a sample of employees
from a large rm. Comparing data from the Current Population Survey and the Social
Security records, Bound and Krueger (1991) fail to nd any signicant bias in the eects
of education, experience, age or other covariates on log earnings. Mellow and Sider (1983)
suggest that the use of survey or employer data does not aect signicantly the structure
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of a wage equation. The detection of this particular type of bias, however, is dicult
since, in practice, these covariates are never error-free. The error in these covariates can
be correlated with the error in earnings causing either an increase or decrease of the bias
in the wage-regression coecients.
3 A Mixed Latent Markov model
Specication of the model
Our aim is to control for measurement error in the year-to-year transitions from and to low
pay. This can be achieved with a Latent Markov model (van de Pol & Langeheine, 1990)
as depicted in Figure 1. According to this model, the true state Xit of an individual i at
a time point t cannot be observed; it is a latent state. We rather observe state Yit, which
might dier from the true (latent) state Xit. Yit and Xit are probabilistically related. The
observed states at dierent time points are mutually independent, conditional on the true
latent states. In other words, we assume that measurement error is not serially correlated
in any way. This means that the independent classication error (ICE) assumption is
made.
The true state Xit follows a Markov process. Thus, the state of an individual i at time
point t, Xit, is independent of the state at time point t
0, Xit0 , where t0 < t 1, conditionally
on the state at t   1, Xi(t 1). An arrow indicates a direct eect, for example of the state
at one time point on the state at the next time point. In our study, Xit and Yit are the
10
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? ? ?
- -... X(t - 1) X(t) X(t + 1) ...
... Y(t - 1) Y(t) Y(t + 1) ...
Figure 1: Path diagram for the Latent Markov model
true and observed earnings state, respectively, that are assumed to take on three values:
low-paid, higher-paid and non-employed. It is obvious that our denition of earnings states
includes a state where the individual has no income from paid employment, the `other' or
non-employment state. For reasons of simplicity, however, we will refer to these states as
`earnings states'.
The joint probability of following a certain path over the T + 1 time points can be
specied as:
P (Yi = yi) =
3X
x0=1
3X
x1=1
:::
3X
xT=1
P (Xi0 = x0)
TY
t=1

P
 
Xit = xtjXi(t 1) = xt 1 )]
TY
t=0
P (Yit = yitjXit = xt) ; (3)
where i = 1; :::; I is the index for the individual, and t = 0; :::; T represents the time points.
The probability P (Yit = yitjXit = xt) represents the measurement error. The identica-
tion of this model requires the assumption that either the measurement error probabilities
or the latent transition probabilities are time homogeneous. In the current application
we assume that the measurement error parameters are time constant. More specically,
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we restrict the probability of observing a state Yit conditional on the true state Xit to be
constant over time, so P (Yi(t 1) = sjXi(t 1) = r) = P (Yit = sjXit = r) for every t. With
these restrictions, the model is identied with at least three time points (Vermunt et al.,
1999).
Since controlling for heterogeneity in Markov models for income mobility is necessary
(Shorrocks, 1976), we control for observed time-constant and time-varying characteristics
in our Latent Markov model following the approach suggested by Vermunt et al. (1999).
Specically, we allow the covariates Zit to aect the latent transition probabilities between
latent states Xi(t 1); Xit.
The transition probabilities between earnings states may also be aected by unobserved
personal characteristics, such as ability and motivation. Failing to control for such unob-
servables may result in an overstatement of the eect of the observed covariates. In the
framework of Markov models, this is usually tackled in a non-parametric way by assuming
that individuals belong to dierent Markov chains. The simplest form of these models is
the mover-stayer model of Blumen et al. (1966), which assumes that the population can be
split into two groups with dierent Markov chains. In one chain (the `movers' chain'), tran-
sitions are unrestricted, while in the `stayers' chain' the transition probability from state j
in time point t  1 to the state k in time point t is 1 if j = k and 0 otherwise. Other, more
complicated Mixed Markov models assume the existence of more than two chains and may
even allow for turnover between the chains (for an overview of these studies, see, van de
Pol & Langeheine, 1990).
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We prefer to adopt a parametric approach of correcting for unobserved heterogeneity,
which makes our model similar to a random-eects panel regression. Specically, we intro-
duce an individual-specic unobserved variable F1i that captures time-invariant individual
eects.
The problem of 'initial conditions' is tackled in a similar way. The sample of individuals
being in state x at the rst time point may not be random and this may aect the tran-
sition probabilities. For example, previous experiences of low pay may aect the low-pay
transition probability (Stewart & Swaeld, 1999; Cappellari & Jenkins, 2004b). We as-
sume that the joint distribution of the individual eects aecting the transition probability
F1i and the individual eects aecting the initial state F2i follows a bivariate normal dis-
tribution. The joint distribution is characterized by one free correlation and two variances
to be estimated:
 = corr(F1i; F2i)
1 = var(F1i)
2 = var(F2i)
The joint probability of having a particular state path conditional on covariate values
13
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can be expressed as:
P (Yi = yijZi) =
Z Z 3X
x0=1
3X
x1=1
:::
3X
xT=1
P (Xi0 = x0jZi1; F2i)
TY
t=1

P
 
Xit = xtjXi(t 1) = xt 1; Zit; F1i)]
TY
t=0
P (Yit = yitjXit = xt)f(F1i; F2i)dF1idF2i ; (4)
where f(F1i; F2i) is the joint density function for the individual eects F1i and F2i.
For the issue of the identication of initial conditions, we should stress that we use a
random eects approach for dealing with possibly correlated unobserved heterogeneity in
the initial state and the transition probabilities. The unobserved heterogeneity in tran-
sition probabilities is assumed to be time-constant and is based on T measurements per
individual. The unobserved heterogeneity component in the initial state concerns a single
measurement occasion (t = 0) and it is less obvious that it can be identied. However, the
logit model for the initial state contains predictors which are not identical to the ones in
the model for the transitions (all time-varying predictors are dierent for at least a part of
the sample), which makes it possible to identify the heterogeneity component in the initial
state.
The Mixed Latent Markov model assumes a rst-order Markov process for the true
states conditionally on the individual's covariate values and the time-constant unobserved
individual eects. However, it should be noted that after marginalizing over the covariates
and individual eects the model does not assume a rst-order Markov process for the true
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state. Moreover, as already mentioned, the model does not assume a rst-order Markov
process for the observed state.
The ICE assumption
The ICE assumption is retained in all aforementioned versions of our model. This implies
that the errors made at dierent time points are uncorrelated conditional on the true state.
This assumption is plausible as there is no obvious process that could lead to an error cor-
relation. A direct serial correlation of the error typically emerges when using retrospective
data (Magnac & Visser, 1999; Bassi et al., 2000). Even in the case of prospective data
studies nd some degree of serial correlation. Bound and Krueger (1991) and Kristensen
and Westergard-Nielsen (2006) nd a serial correlation of 0.3 - 0.4 in measurement error.
However, this serial correlation is mostly an eect of the type and level of income as well
as of some personal characteristics of the respondent. Nordberg et al. (2004) suggest that
income from self-employment and income transfers are more prone to error and that this
error is larger for respondents younger than 30 and older than 55. Bound and Krueger
(1991) and Bollinger (1998) suggest that the size and the structure of measurement error
are dierent between men and women. Kristensen and Westergard-Nielsen (2006) suggest
that measurement error is higher for the low incomes. These issues are largely taken care of
in our study as we restrict our sample to male, prime-age wage earners (see section 4) and
we condition the measurement error on the true pay level of the respondent. According to
the survey of Bound et al. (2001), in such a sample, there is no consistent evidence of a
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correlation of measurement error with demographic or human capital characteristics.
Another source of serial correlation may emerge from the tendency of respondents
to round up numbers. Using the Finnish sample of the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP), Hanisch (2005) nds that almost one third of all gross earnings are rounded
after the rst digit while almost half after the second digit. In the Danish ECHP sample,
this percentage rises to 79% (Kristensen & Westergard-Nielsen, 2006). This appears to be
much less of a problem in our data where less than 2% of all earnings are rounded after
the rst digit and less than 7% after the second digit.
Despite the aforementioned arguments, some sources of violation of the ICE assumption
may still exist. The working hours are used to construct the pay status of the respondent
(see section 4). The error in the reported working hours may be serially correlated, espe-
cially towards the direction of over-reporting (Mellow & Sider, 1983). For this reason, we
also perform a sensitivity analysis where we relax the ICE assumption. For this purpose, we
use a variable that may aect the measurement error but is unrelated to low-pay mobility.
Specically, in some household surveys, respondents are asked to show their pay slip to the
interviewer. If the ICE assumption is not valid, introducing this variable as a predictor of
measurement error should reduce considerably the size of the measurement error and give
a dierent picture on the latent transition probabilities. If we had multiple indicators for
the earnings state (i.e. indicators coming from dierent measures of the wage), we could
relax the ICE assumption in a more `direct' way, by assuming that the measurement error
is serially correlated. However, our data do not allow such an approach.
16
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Parameter estimation
The estimates for the parameters of our model are obtained by means of maximum like-
lihood. Specically, we use a variant of the well-known Expected Maximization (EM)
algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977), which switches between an E step and a M step until
it achieves convergence. The E-step of the EM algorithm involves computing the expected
value of the complete data log-likelihood or, more intuitively, lling in the missing data
(here the unobserved class memberships and the unobserved random eects) with their
expected values given the current parameter values and the observed data. In the M
step, standard estimation methods are used to update the model parameter such that the
expected complete data log-likelihood is maximized. In our case the M step involves esti-
mating logistic regression models for the initial state, the transition, and the measurement
error probabilities using the marginal posteriors obtained in the E step as weights. The E
and M steps cycle until a certain converge criterion is reached.
The relevant variant of EM, which is called the forward-backward or Baum-Welch algo-
rithm, is implemented in the recent syntax version of the statistical software LatentGOLD
(Vermunt & Magidson, 2008). The standard EM algorithm cannot be applied for Latent
Markov models for many time points T , as the time and storage needed for computation
increases exponentially with T (Vermunt et al., 1999). The extended version of the forward-
backward algorithm we applied supports multivariate analysis and control for unobserved
heterogeneity, features that are required for our analysis.
The log-likelihood function that is maximized is based on the probability density pro-
17
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vided in equation 4. Taking the log of this density and summing over all individuals gives
the log-likelihood function that is maximized:
logL =
NX
i=1
lnP (Yi = yijZi) (5)
Thus, in fact, it is assumed that the joint response vector of an individual (Yi) follows a
multinomial distribution conditional on the predictor values (Zi). No additional assump-
tions other than the ones implied by the model need to be made for parameter estimation
by maximum likelihood. Parameter estimation is presented in detail in Appendix B (see,
also, Vermunt et al., 2008).
4 Data and main concepts
The study uses data for the period 1991-2004 from three national panel datasets. For
the UK, we use waves 1 to 14 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (Taylor et
al., 2006), covering the years 1991-2004. For Germany, we make use of 14 waves of the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) (Wagner et al., 2007), which cover the period
1991-2004. For the Netherlands, our data come from the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP)
(CBS, 1991). We make use of the last 12 waves of the panel, covering the years 1991-2002.
The information from the three datasets has been made highly comparable for the purpose
of this study.The BHPS data were made available by the Data Archive at Essex University.
The GSOEP was provided by the German Institute for Economic Research. The SEP was
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made accessible by Statistics Netherlands. The full list of the variables included in our
analysis is presented in detail in Appendix A.
In the light of the discussion in section 3, we compare these three countries with respect
to the amount of 'true' low-pay transitions. In the liberal-unregulated labour market of the
UK, individuals are supposed to experience a higher level of wage mobility than in both
the semi-regulated Dutch labour market and the highly regulated German labour market.
A model that does not control for measurement error may over- or underestimate cross-
country dierences due to possible dierences in the amount and type of error between the
three national datasets.
Since we focus on earnings transitions of employed individuals, our sample consists of
prime age males (aged 25-55). Women are not included in our sample as they tend to
have much more heterogeneous career paths than men. The main reason for this is that
childbirth is a major event that aects their labour supply decision (Dex et al., 1998).
Moreover, the country's institutional support for mothers aects decisively this decision
(Uunk et al., 2005) as well as the joint decision of the couple for labour supply (Powell,
2002). Especially in the Netherlands, the decision of women about their labour supply has
implications for the number of hours they work (Paull, 2008). Therefore, to adequately
investigate the mobility patterns of female workers we would have to control for childbirth
and to add part-time employment in the possible destination states of our model. These
aspects fall beyond the scope of this paper.
Our main economic variable is the earnings state of the individual, dened as the level
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of the hourly wage. Since there is no direct information available on an individual's hourly
wage, this is computed by dividing the total gross annual earnings from paid employment
by the total amount of the annual hours worked. As in the SEP and the GSOEP, only
retrospective wage information is available, the wage in t is derived from wave t + 1.
We dene two real earnings states, low paid and higher paid, as well as an `other' (non-
employment) state.
Only individuals reporting paid employment as their main employment status are clas-
sied in one of the two earnings states. The self-employed are clustered in the `other' state
(non-employment state). Individuals who are in education or in apprenticeship - especially
relevant for Germany - are also classied as non-employed. This `other' state is very het-
erogeneous implying that transitions to and from `other' cannot be expected to have a
clear interpretation. However, the inclusion of such a state in our dependent variable is
important from both a substantial and methodological point of view. Several studies, such
as Cappellari and Jenkins (2004a) and Stewart (2007) show that being in non-employment
is a possible cause of moving to a low-paid job and vice versa. Moreover, ignoring the
non-employment state would make it impossible to dene a Latent Markov model as the
latent states should not only be mutually exclusive but also exhaustive.
Each individual is included in the analysis from the time point he rst enters the survey.
Using maximum likelihood estimation with missing data, we deal with the fact that at
some occasions information for the earnings state of the individual may be missing, due to
non-response or temporary attrition. This approach does not cause any bias as long as non-
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response is random conditionally on the observed wage and covariate information, that is,
as long as the missing data is missing at random (MAR). Missing values in covariates were
imputed by interpolation when possible. For example if the individual reported `higher
education' in t   1 and t + 1, and the value for education was missing for t we imputed
the value for education in t as being `higher education'. Interpolation is a practical way to
keep individuals with missing values on time-varying predictors in the analysis. As typically
done in statistical models with predictors that are estimated by Maximum Likelihood, our
likelihood function is constructed conditional on the predictors (see equation 4). This
means that modeling the covariate distribution under a missing at random assumption is
not an option. Other, more sophisticated (multiple) imputation strategies are possible.
However, they fall outside the scope of the current paper. The remaining missing values
were imputed by the mean of the relevant variable.
5 Measurement error and its eect
Descriptive part
In total, we applied ten versions of the model described by equations (3) and (4); namely,
a standard Markov model (Model 1), a Latent Markov model (Model 2), a Markov model
with covariates (Model 3), a Latent Markov model with covariates (Model 4), three Markov
models with covariates controlling for unobservables (Mixed Markov models - Models 5, 7
and 9) and three Mixed Latent Markov models correcting for both measurement error and
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for observed and unobserved heterogeneity (Models 6, 8 and 10). In Models 5 and 6, initial
conditions are treated as exogenous. In Models 7 and 8, we assume perfect correlation
between the unobservables aecting the initial state and the latent transition probability.
In Models 9 and 10, the aforementioned assumption is relaxed and dierent individual
eects are allowed to aect the initial state and the transition probability.
Table 1: Model comparison
UK Netherlands Germany
LL BIC (LL) LL BIC (LL) LL BIC (LL)
1. Markov -21,937.6 43,947.0 -9,553.9 19,175.6 -23,803.8 47,680.3
2. Latent Markov -21,211.3 42,548.2 -9,125.6 18,469.9 -22,988.5 46,104.2
3. Markov with covariates -22,882.0 46,535.6 -9,182.8 19,044.0 -19,250.9 39,337.3
4. Latent Markov with covariates -20,080.9 40,987.2 -8,878.4 18,486.2 -16,693.0 34,276.0
5. Mixed Markov with covariates 1 -20,670.8 42,131.1 -9,145.7 18,986.7 -19,165.8 39,185.3
6. Mixed Latent Markov with covariates 1 -20,138.9 41,121.2 -8,876.4 18,499.0 -16,580.0 34,068.3
7. Mixed Markov with covariates 2 -20,353.1 41,513.7 -8,910.5 18,533.4 -18,941.3 38,754.5
8. Mixed Latent Markov with covariates 2 -19,955.0 40,771.4 -8,842.1 18,447.3 -16,527.8 33,982.0
9. Mixed Markov with covariates 3 -19,851.8 40,645.8 -8,910.5 18,541.9 -16,501.6 34,102.2
10. Mixed Latent Markov with covariates 3 -19,456.8 39,909.5 -8,842.1 18,455.8 -13,127.0 27,407.4
Note: In Models 5 and 6, initial conditions are treated as exogenous. In Models 7 and 8, we assume perfect correlation between the
unobservables aecting the initial state and the latent transition probability. In Models 9 and 10, the two unobserved eects are allowed
to vary freely.
The Log-Likelihood values and the BIC values for the estimated models are reported
in Table 1. This Table shows that Model 2 ts the data considerable better than Model
1, Model 4 better than Model 3, Model 6 better than Model 5, Model 8 than Model
7 and Model 10 than Model 9. This indicates that correcting for measurement error is
important, regardless of whether we control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
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Also controlling for observed characteristics improves the t of the model in the UK and
in Germany, as can be seen by comparing the t of either Models 1 and 3 or Models 2
and 4. In these two countries, correcting for unobservables improves further the t of the
model (comparison of Model 3 with Models 5, 7 and 9, and Model 4 with Models 6, 8 and
10). For the Netherlands, however, controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity
or for initial conditions does not improve signicantly the t of the model.
Controlling for initial conditions appears also to be important for our analysis, in the
UK and in Germany. A comparison of the t values for the models that assume exogeneity
of initial conditions (Models 5 and 6) with the models that relax this assumption (Models
7 and 9 as well as Models 8 and 10, respectively) indicates that this assumption is not
plausible. Even the assumption of perfect correlation between the the unobservables af-
fecting the initial state and the latent transition probability is rather strong; when this
assumption is relaxed the t of the model is further improved (comparison of Models 7 and
8 with Models 9 and 10, respectively). The importance of controlling for initial conditions
is analyzed further in the discussion of the estimates for the correlations of the unobserved
eects. From here on, if not otherwise indicated, our results will be based on Models 9 and
10.
A question we tackle here is how much classication error exists in earnings states. The
amount of measurement error can be derived from the estimated values for the probabilities
P (Yit = yitjXit = xt) that are presented in Table 2. These estimates indicate that there
is a large amount of classication error for the low-paid workers in all three countries.
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Table 2: The size of the measurement error according to Model 10
UK Germany
Observed state Observed state
low high other low higher other
Latent
state
low 0.658 0.259 0.083 low 0.684 0.272 0.044
(0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001)
higher 0.013 0.972 0.016 higher 0.006 0.994 0.000
(0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
other 0.009 0.007 0.984 other 0.000 0.001 0.999
(0.001) (0.002) (0.013) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
Netherlands
Observed state
low higher other
Latent
state
low 0.705 0.294 0.001
(0.019) (0.018) (0.001)
higher 0.006 0.989 0.005
0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
other 0.003 0.009 0.988
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
In the Netherlands, 29.5% (29.4% plus 0.10%) of the low-paid workers are misclassied
into another state, while in the UK this gure is 34.2%, and in Germany 31.6%. In all
three countries, the misclassication of low-paid workers is more likely to be into the higher
earnings state than into the other (non-employment) state, which shows that many workers
that are truly low paid are observed to have earnings above the low-pay threshold.
Measurement error for workers who are truly in the higher-paid and non-employment
states is considerably lower than in the low-paid state. In the three countries under scrutiny,
it ranges between 0.6% and 2.9% for the higher paid and between 0.1% and 1.6% for the
non-employed.
It is important to stress the fact that the size of measurement error is not sensitive
to the specication of the model. The estimates for the error do not dier more than 2%
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between Models 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 as dened in Table 1.
Table 3: Observed and latent transitions
Observed transitions Latent transitions
United Kingdom
State in t State in t
low higher other low higher other
State
in t  1
low 0.519 0.382 0.099 low 0.722 0.186 0.092
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005)
higher 0.052 0.899 0.049 higher 0.016 0.949 0.035
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
other 0.057 0.090 0.853 other 0.069 0.055 0.876
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Netherlands
State in t State in t
low higher other low higher other
State
in t  1
low 0.463 0.416 0.121 low 0.680 0.165 0.154
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009)
higher 0.027 0.948 0.025 other 0.011 0.976 0.013
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
other 0.067 0.092 0.841 other 0.085 0.049 0.866
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Germany
State in t State in t
low higher other low higher other
State
in t  1
low 0.402 0.420 0.178 low 0.614 0.203 0.183
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008)
higher 0.028 0.904 0.068 higher 0.012 0.931 0.058
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
other 0.074 0.143 0.782 other 0.161 0.136 0.703
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The observed transitions are estimated with the rst-order
Markov model. The latent transitions are estimated with the MLM model. The reference person in the MLM
model is a person having the `average' characteristics. The covariates included in the MLM model are calendar
time, age, education, labour market experience (not available in the Netherlands) and the Gini coecient.
The implication of controlling for possible classication errors on the estimates of the
transition probabilities between earnings states is illustrated in Table 3. The left panel of
the table shows the average transition probabilities without controlling for measurement
error, while the right panel shows the true (i.e. latent) average transition probabilities.
'Observed transitions' represent the estimated transitions from Model 9, and 'latent tran-
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sitions' denote the estimated transitions from Model 10. The former are thus transitions
that are `contaminated' by measurement error while the latter are `error-free'. To perform
cross-country comparisons in low-wage transition probabilities, we need to account for the
dierent structure of the wage distribution in dierent countries. This is accounted for
by using the Gini coecient for wage inequality as a control variable. The full list of the
control variables is presented in the next section.
Verifying the ndings of previous research, we show that low-pay transitions are con-
siderably less than originally thought. More specically, we nd that observed transitions
from low to higher pay are overestimated by a factor of 2.1 - 2.5. Without controlling
for measurement error, 38.2% of British low-paid workers increase their earnings above the
low-pay threshold in a one-year period. This fraction of year-to-year movers drops to 18.6%
when we control for measurement error. Results for the other two countries are similar.
The `true' amount of transitions from low to higher pay in Germany is 20.3% and not 42%
as the `error-contaminated' model suggests. In the Netherlands, the true low-to-high pay
transitions are even less frequent: 16.5% compared to 41.6% as estimated by the model
that does not correct for measurement error.
In all three countries, the transitions from higher to low pay are also severely overes-
timated. Although the transition probabilities are much lower than those from low pay,
the fraction of spurious transitions is equally large. More specically, in the UK, these
transitions are overestimated by a factor of 2.7, in the Netherlands by 2.5, and in Germany
by 2.3.
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Interesting cross-country dierences emerge from Table 3. In accordance with Pavlopoulos
and Fouarge (2010), the smallest low-to-higher pay transition probability among the three
countries under scrutiny is found for the Netherlands. Although, this country is the most
egalitarian in terms of wage inequality, it presents the largest persistence in low pay. The
highest transition probability from low to higher pay is found in Germany.
Sensitivity analysis: the ICE assumption
So far, the ICE assumption has been retained. In other words, we have assumed that, con-
ditional on the true status, there is no serial correlation in measurement error. In the light
of the discussion in section 3, in this section, we relax this assumption. More specically,
we estimate again Model 6 by assuming that the measurement error also depends on the
variable indicating whether the interviewer has seen the pay slip of the respondent. As
this information is only collected by the BHPS, we restrict our analysis in the UK. Table
4 compares the model t measures, the size of the measurement error and the amount
of transitions from low pay between 3 models: Models 5 and 6 are similar to the relevant
Models that are presented in Table 1 and Model 6a, which is the model that relaxes the ICE
assumption. However, Models 5 and 6 are estimated with a a smaller set of covariates than
in Table 1. This explains the dierence in the values of the model t measures between
Table 4 and and Table 1. Due to the complexity of the model, this sensitivity analysis
could not be performed with Models 7-10 that also control for unobserved heterogeneity.
The rst part of Table 4 shows that by relaxing the ICE assumption, the model t
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Table 4: Sensitivity of low-pay transitions to the ICE assumption - the UK
Model t
Log Likelihood BIC (LL)
5. Mixed Markov with covariates 1 -22.882.0 46.535.6
6. Mixed Latent Markov with covariates 1 -20.080.9 40.987.2
6a. Mixed Latent Markov with covariates 1a -19.548.9 39.990.8
Measurement error
low higher other
6. Mixed Latent Markov with covariates 1 0.668 0.258 0.074
6a. Mixed Latent Markov with covariates 1a 0.681 0.205 0.114
Transitions
low higher other
5. Mixed Markov with covariates 1 0.540 0.326 0.134
6. Mixed Latent Markov with covariates 1 0.654 0.205 0.142
6a. Mixed Latent Markov with covariates 1a 0.724 0.189 0.087
Note: Models 5 and 6 have a similar specication to the one in Table 1. The dierence is only that a smaller set of
covariates was used. This explains the dierence in the values of the model t measures between this Table and and Table
1. Model 6a is similar to Model 6. The dierence is that the measurement error in this model depends also on whether the
interviewer has seen the pay slip of the respondent. Only transitions from low pay are presented here.
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is improved. However, the second and third part of this table show that the dierences
between the model that retains the ICE assumption (Model 6) and the model that relaxes
it (Model 6a) are not dramatic. More specically, the overall size of the measurement error
slightly reduces (1.3%) when we relax the ICE assumption. Although the overall dierence
is small, the distribution of the measurement error to the dierent observed states diers
between Models 6 and 6a. According to Model 6a, respondents that in reality are low paid
report mistakenly much less that they are in higher pay and much more that they are in
non-employment than Model 6 suggests.
Comparing the amount of the transitions out of the low pay status between Models
6 and 6a shows that a larger pay stability emerges when the ICE assumption is relaxed.
However, this larger pay stability is due to the much lower amount of latent transitions
from low pay to non-employment. Transitions from low pay to higher pay decrease only
by 1.6% when we move from Model 6 to Model 6a.
All in all, the results of this sensitivity analysis indicate that although the relaxation of
the ICE assumption improves the model t, the main conclusions of our research are not
seriously aected by the ICE assumption.
Sensitivity analysis: denitions of low pay
The analysis we performed until now was based on a low-pay threshold equal to two-thirds
of the median wage. However, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(1996) suggests that both the incidence of low pay within a country and the ranking
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Figure 2: Distribution of the hourly wage for male workers aged 16-55 and for the year
2000.
of countries with respect to low-pay incidence are sensitive to the choice of the low-pay
threshold. To check whether our results are also sensitive to this choice, we repeat the same
analysis with dierent low-pay thresholds. We restrict our tests to relative measures of low
pay as these are more appropriate for cross-country comparisons than absolute measures
(Forster, 1994). More specically, instead of two-thirds of the median wage as the low-pay
threshold, we use 50% and 40% of the median hourly wage. The 50% of the median is a
measure used often by EUROSTAT, while the 40% of the median is a level close to the UK
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poverty line derived from the Supplementary Benet scale in the 1990's. Figure 2 shows
that changing the low-pay denition from two-thirds of the median to 50% of the median
results in a considerable reduction in the proportion of the low paid in all three countries.
The elasticity of the proportion of low paid with respect to the percentage of the median
at which the low-paid threshold is set equals 1.095 in the UK, 0.845 in Germany and 0.595
in the Netherlands. This means that the percentage of low-paid workers is most sensitive
to the low-pay threshold in the UK, and least sensitive in the Netherlands. Please note
that these elasticities are calculated for values close to two thirds of the median.
Table 5: Sensitivity of low-pay transitions to the low-pay threshold
UK Netherlands Germany
low higher other low higher other low higher other
2/3 of the
median
0.722 0.186 0.092 0.680 0.165 0.154 0.614 0.203 0.183
(0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.056) (0.036) (0.037) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008)
50% of the
median
0.604 0.260 0.136 0.511 0.203 0.286 0.550 0.253 0.197
(0.037) (0.017) (0.026) (0.052) (0.038) (0.035) (0.018) (0.015) (0.005)
40% of the
median
0.459 0.354 0.187 0.494 0.238 0.268 0.427 0.348 0.224
(0.044) (0.016) (0.041) (0.057) (0.082) (0.054) (0.023) (0.020) (0.006)
Note: These transition probabilities are estimated using separate Mixed Latent Markov models (Model 10), each time
by using a dierent low pay threshold. Here we only present the transition probabilities from low pay.
Table 5 presents the main ndings from the analysis using each of these alternative
denitions of low pay, where we concentrate on transitions from low pay. As can be
seen, the lower the percentage of the median at which the threshold is set, the higher
the transition rate out of low pay. The ranking of countries with respect to the low-
pay transition probability remains unchanged when we consider the aggregate transition
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probability from low pay. However, if we focus on transitions from low to higher pay,
the transition probability is the highest in the UK when we apply the thresholds of 40%
or 50% of the median, whereas it is highest for Germany with the higher threshold. It
seems, therefore, that in the liberal British labour market slightly higher mobility rates
are observed at the very low end of the wage distribution than is the case for in the highly
regulated German labour market. Since the wage distribution of the UK is more left-
skewed than the German distribution, the average distance from the low-pay threshold
is much larger in the UK than in Germany, which makes crossing the threshold much
more dicult for the British low-paid workers than for the German ones. When we apply
a lower threshold, the average distance from the threshold in the UK is decreased and
low-pay transition probabilities increase considerably. Again, the lowest low-to-high pay
transition probabilities are found in the Netherlands.
Discussion of the results
Before discussing the parameter estimates for our main covariates, it is worth elaborating
on the correlation structure of our unobservables. Table 6 presents the variances and
correlations of the individual eects from Models 9 and 10 for all three countries. This
Table shows clearly that initial conditions are endogenous. The correlation of the individual
eects aecting the initial state and the transition equation is strongly signicant in all
three countries. Moreover, it is signicant in both the 'error-contaminated' and in the
'error-free' model (Models 9 and 10, respectively). This nding means that being truly in
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low pay at the rst year of observation increases the likelihood of being in low pay in the
years thereafter. Our results here are in accordance to previous research on the eect of
initial conditions on low-wage mobility (Stewart & Swaeld, 1999; Cappellari & Jenkins,
2004b).
Table 6: Variances and covariances of the individual eects
UK Netherlands Germany
Model 9 Model 10 Model 9 Model 10 Model 9 Model 10
1 0.477
 0.399 0.315 0.237 0.740 0.515
2 0.951 3.237
 0.245 1.842 0.880 0.450
 0.604 0.893 0.278 0.486 0.807 0.481
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
As a next step in our analysis, we assess the impact of classication errors in the
earnings state on the estimated covariate eects of our panel-regression model. For this
purpose, in Table 7, we compare the estimates from Model 9 and Model 10. The main
variables of interest are labour market events that can potentially account for a considerable
wage change, and can therefore cause a transition from low to higher pay or vice versa.
These event variables are a job change, an occurrence of formal training, a transition from
a temporary employment contract to a permanent one, or vice versa, and a transition
from part-time employment to full-time employment, or vice versa. Our control variables
are the Gini coecient, calendar time, education, labour market experience, changes in
marital status and, in Germany, also apprenticeship. For the Netherlands, as experience
is not available we use age as a proxy.
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One commonly-used specication is to allow covariates to aect the probability of being
in a certain state at a time point t. We use another more exible specication in which
covariates have an eect on making a particular type of transition. For example, our model
estimates the eect of a job change on making a transition from low pay to higher pay
rather than `just' estimating the eect of this covariate on being in low pay. The statistical
signicance of the dierence between the estimate of each covariate eect in the `error-
contaminated' model (Model 9) and the `error-free' model (Model 10) is assessed using a
Hausman test (Hausman, 1978).
We rst discuss the estimates from Model 10, the `error-free' model. Job-related train-
ing seems to be an important determinant of low-wage mobility. Training has a positive
eect on the probability of a low-to-higher pay transition in the UK and in the Netherlands,
while it has no eect in Germany. We should stress here that our variable for training does
not include apprenticeship. In Germany, apprenticeship is included as a control variable.
Our results - not presented here - show that having apprenticeship qualications increases
the probability of a low-paid to higher-paid transition. Moreover, the denition of the
training variable is not uniform across countries. See Appendix A for details. In both
the UK and in Germany, a job change increases the probability for a higher-to-low pay
transition. For the Netherlands we were unable to include a job change variable due to an
artifact in the data.
Changes in the employment contract type present some dierences across countries.
A shift from a temporary to a permanent contract has no eect in the UK or in the
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Netherlands. On the contrary, in Germany, such a shift increases the probability of a low- to
higher-pay transition and decreases the probability of a higher-paid to low-paid transition.
The reverse shift, from a permanent to a temporary contract, has no signicant eect on
the low-wage transition probabilities in any of the three countries. In the Netherlands and
in Germany, however, it increases the probability for a higher-to-low wage transition.
The lack of any signicant nding concerning employment contract changes for the UK
is not surprising. Since in the British labour market, job protection for both permanent
and temporary workers is low, both types of workers have the same status with respect
to pay, promotion opportunities and job quality. In the same line of reasoning, temporary
employment in Germany holds a much lower status than in the UK. The German labour
market is a typical `insiders' labour market, where `core' workers in the primary segment
enjoy a high level of job protection and higher wages, while their counterparts in the
secondary segment are much less protected and much more exposed to low pay (Blossfeld,
2001). A shift from temporary to permanent employment is likely to represent a move from
the secondary into the primary segment of the labour market. For the Netherlands, we
expected the relevant estimates to be in between the British and the German estimates, as
the Dutch labour market is featured strong job protection but rather a lenient regulation
with respect to temporary contracts (Muels & Luijkx, 2006). However, the results show
no signicant wage eect of a shift from a temporary to a permanent contract. A possible
explanation for this nding is that, in the Netherlands, changes of the employment contract
and shifts from part-time to full-time employment, or vice versa, may also have captured
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the eects of a job change. That means that the contract change may also involve a change
of job on the internal or external labour market involving a dierent pay scheme.
A shift from full-time to part-time employment or vice versa is also an important
determinant of low-pay transitions. The shift from full-time to part-time work increases
the probability for a low-to-higher wage mobility in the Netherlands and the probability for
a higher-to-low pay transition in Germany. The reverse shift, from part-time to full-time
employment increases the probability of a transition from low to higher pay in Germany
(the estimate is signicant only at the 10% level) but remarkably also the likelihood of a
move from higher to low pay in all three countries to more or less the same extent.
The interpretation of these results involves 2 processes. The rst process suggests that
a involuntary decrease of working hours without an employer change may be accompanied
by a demotion or a shift to a job that is less important for the rm. Such a shift leads
probably to a lower wage. The opposite should happen for an increase of working hours
without an employer change. We would expect these eects to be stronger in countries
such as Germany and the UK, where due to occupational segregation part-time jobs are
relatively 'bad' jobs in terms of pay and promotion chances, than in countries such as
the Netherlands, where part-time jobs are widespread and have an increased level of job
quality (Fouarge & Muels, 2010). This explains the relevant nding for Germany and the
Netherlands but not the insignicant result for the UK.
The second process may explain the positive eect of a shift from part-time to full-
time employment on the higher-to-low pay probability in all three countries. This process
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suggests individual preferences for the total earnings matter more than preferences for the
hourly wage. The male beholder of these jobs may prefer to work longer hours with lower
hourly pay over fewer hours with a higher hourly pay. Hence, when workers increase their
working hours, they may accept a lower hourly wage in order to receive higher monthly
earnings. The positive eect we observe in all countries of a shift from part-time to full-time
employment on the higher-to-low pay probability is probably explained by this preference
shifting process.
Although results from the coecient estimation are plausible, two words of caution
should be added. The rst issue involves a possible correlation in the measurement error
of the dependent and the independent variable. Working hours is used both for the con-
struction of our dependent variable (i.e. the earnings state) and for the denition of the
dummies for a full-time to part-time shift and the part-time to full-time shift. Therefore,
any error in the measurement of the number of working hours aects both variables. This
correlation between the errors in the dependent and in the independent variable may cause
some bias in the estimation of the coecient of the shifts between full-time and part-time
work.
The second issue involves the underlying assumption of our model that all predictors
are strictly exogenous, i.e. that the error term is uncorrelated to the past, current and
future realizations of the predictors. It can be expected that this assumption does not hold
to a certain extend when low-paid workers have more chances than higher-paid workers to
change contract or number of working hours. This issue has been investigated for the case
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of employment participation and household composition as predictors of poverty (Biewen,
2009). However, the bias resulting from the possible violation of this assumption is likely
to be rather small and correcting for it in this context is left for further scrutiny.
As far as the expected impact of correcting for measurement error is concerned, the
ndings in Table 7 conrm our expectations. Comparing the estimates of Models 9 and 10
shows that many covariate eects are attenuated by measurement error. For example, the
eect of job change on the transition from higher to low paid in the UK is underestimated
by 29.6%. The eect of training on the transition from low to higher pay in the Netherlands
is underestimated by 13.2%. However, in some cases covariate eects are overestimated
due to measurement error. The eect of a shift from full-time to part-time work on the
transition from low to higher pay in the Netherlands in overestimated by 47.9%. We should
remember here that the dierence in the sizes of the covariate eects between Models 9
and 10 may also represent processes other than just correction for measurement error in
the dependent variable. If there is error in the measurement of the covariates, then this
error might be correlated with the error in the dependent variable. In this case, what
is being measured is a combination of two processes: the attenuation of the eect of the
covariate due to the classication error in the earnings state, and the ambiguous eect of
the correlation of the errors in the dependent and the independent variable.
In most cases, however, the eect of the covariates is strengthened when correcting for
measurement error. Therefore, controlling for classication error in the earnings state is
necessary in order to obtain correct (or at least more correct) estimates of the covariates.
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An extension of this study may concern distinguishing further the eect of measurement
error. Several studies, such as Shorrocks (1976) and Lillard and Willis (1978), suggest that
higher order processes determine income mobility. According to these studies, these higher
order processes are caused by heterogeneity and unobserved serial correlation. In this
paper, we have controlled for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Nevertheless, as our
model does not make use of validation data, some true second-order process is classied
as measurement error. This may happen because our model derives from the longitudinal
information for all individuals a pattern of `regular transition behaviour' for individuals
belonging to state x (Vermunt, 2004). The obvious result of this is that our model, as well
as other similar models, may slightly overestimate the amount of measurement error. From
a policy perspective, however, this is not necessarily bad. Our model does not only lter
out measurement error but may also remove the transitory moves from the earnings states.
Thus, the `true' transitions we estimate are the transitions between the states xj and xk
when accompanied by a change in transition `behavior'; from the transition `behaviour'
corresponding to individuals in state xj to the transition `behaviour' of individuals in state
xk.
Appendix A: Description of the variables
Calendar time: We use dummies for every year. For the UK, this varies between 1991
and 2004, for Germany between 1991 and 2004 and for the Netherlands between 1991 and
2002.
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Gini coecient: This is the Gini coecient for the male hourly wages. It is calculated
on a yearly basis.
Education: This is the highest educational level completed by the individual. It can take
three values, lower than high school, high school and higher education.
Training: It takes the value 1 when the individual received formal training during the year
prior to the survey and 0 in all other cases. In the UK and in the Netherlands, training
refers to both part-time and full-time courses, while in Germany, it refers only to full-time
courses.
Labour market experience: Measured in months. This is available only for the UK and
for Germany. It is constructed by combining data from the yearly les and the employment
history les of BHPS and GSOEP.
Age: Measured in years.
Job change: It takes the value 1 when the individual changed an employer during the year
prior to the survey and 0 in all other cases. It also takes the value 0 when the individual
moves from or to non-employment as well as when he remains in non-employment. This
variable was not included for the Netherlands.
Temporary to permanent: It takes the value 1 when the individual reported being
employed with a temporary contract in t 1 and being employed with a permanent contract
in t and 0 in all other cases. It also takes the value 0 when the individual moves from or
to non-employment as well as when he remains in non-employment.
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Permanent to temporary: It takes the value 1 when the individual reported being
employed with a permanent contract in t 1 and being employed with a temporary contract
in t and 0 in all other cases. It also takes the value 0 when the individual moves from or
to non-employment as well as when he remains in non-employment.
Part-time to full-time: It takes the value 1 when the individual reported being employed
part-time in t  1 and being employed full-time in t and 0 in all other cases. It also takes
the value 0 when the individual moves from or to non-employment as well as when he
remains in non-employment.
Full-time to part-time: It takes the value 1 when the individual reported being employed
part-time in t  1 and being employed full-time in t and 0 in all other cases. It also takes
the value 0 when the individual moves from or to non-employment as well as when he
remains in non-employment.
Appendix B: The parameter estimation
The estimates for the parameters of our model are obtained by means of maximum likeli-
hood, where the likelihood contribution of individual i equals the density given in equation
(4). We solve the integral using Gauss-Hermite numerical integration, which means that
the integrals are replaced by a sum over L quadrature nodes. Below, we will refer to a
particular node by w, to its location by Fw and to its weight by w.
The numerically integrated log-likelihood function is maximized using a special variant
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of the Expected Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977) called the forward-
backward or Baum-Welch algorithm (Baum et al., 1970). Below we present an expanded
version of this algorithm for the situation in which the latent Markov model contains
random eects. The EM algorithm is a general iterative procedure for maximum likelihood
estimation in the presence of latent variables or other types of missing data. It switches
between an E-step and an M-step till convergence. The E-step computes the expected
value of the complete log-likelihood or, more intuitively, estimates the missing data (here
the unobserved class memberships and random eects). For this, the algorithm employs the
expected value given the current parameter values and the observed data. For the mixed
latent Markov model described in equation (4), contribution of case i to the expected
complete-data log-likelihood, E(logLi); is as follows:
E(logLi) =
LX
w=1
3X
x0=1
iwx0 logP (Xi0 = x0jZi0;Fw)
+
TX
t=1
LX
w=1
3X
xt 1=1
3X
xt=1
iwxt 1xt logP (Xit = xtjXi(t 1) = xt 1;Zit;Fw)
+
TX
t=0
3X
xt=1
ixt logP (Yit = yitjXit = xt);
The E-step requires updating the marginal posterior probabilities iwx0 , iwxt 1xt , and ixt ,
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which are dened as:
iwx0 = P (w; x0jyi;Zi);
iwxt 1xt = P (w; xt 1; xtjyi;Zi);
ixt = P (xtjyi;Zi):
The forward-backward algorithm obtains them by a recursive scheme and once found they
are used in the above equation for the next M-step.
The two key components of the Baum-Welch algorithm are the forward probabilities
iwxt and the backward probabilities iwxt . These two quantities are dened as follows:
iwxt = P (w; xt; yi0:::yitjZi);
iwxt = P (yi(t+1):::yiT jw; xt;Zi):
Thus, the forward probability iwxt refers to having the observed set of responses, i.e.
observed states, up to time point t, being in latent state xt at t, and having random eects
corresponding to node w, conditional on covariate values and model parameters. The
backward probability iwxt is the probability of having the observed set of responses after
time point t, conditional on being in latent class xt at t, the random eects corresponding
to node w; covariate values and model parameters. Using iwxt , and iwxt , one can obtain
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the relevant marginal posteriors as follows:
iwx0 =
iwx0iwx0
P (yijZi) ;
iwxt 1xt =
iwxt 1P (xtjxt 1;Zit;Fw)P (yitjxt;Zit;Fw) iwxt
P (yijZi)
ixt =
LX
w=1
iwxtiwxt
P (yijZi) ;
where P (yijZi) =
PL
w=1
P3
xt=1
iwxtiwxt for any t; and P (xtjxt 1;Zit;Fw) and P (yitjxt;Zit;Fw)
are model probabilities from the previous M-step.
The key element of the forward-backward algorithm is that T +1 sets of iwxt and iwxt
terms are computed using recursive schemes. The forward recursion scheme for iwxt is:
iwx0 = w P (Xi0 = x0jZi0; w)P (yi0jXi0 = x0;Zi0;Fw);
iwxt =
(
KX
xt 1=1
iwxt 1P
 
Xit = xtjXi(t 1) = xt 1;ZitFw
)
P (yitjXit = xt;Zit;Fw) ;
for t = 1 up to t = T . The backward recursion scheme for iwxt is:
iwxT = 1;
iwxt =
KX
xt+1=1
iwxt+1P (xt+1jxt;Zit;Fw)P (yit+1jxt+1;Zit;Fw) ;
fort = T 1 down to t = 0. So, we obtain iwxt and iwxt for all time points using the model
probabilities from the previous M step and use these to obtain the posterior probabilities
iwx0 , iwxt 1xt , and ixt :
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The M-step uses standard estimation methods to update the model parameters, such
that the expected complete-data log-likelihood is maximized or increased. Here, the M-
step involves using the lled-in expected values as if they were observed data in logistic
regression analysis. The E- and M-step cycle till a certain convergence criterion has been
reached.
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